The Coach's Fatal Mistake? Taking On The Executives and the Unassailable Leadership Tier
Turns out Ruben Amorim could survive a loss to lower-league opposition. He weathered an important European final against a particularly poor Tottenham teams for many years. He withstood home defeats against domestic rivals, finishing 15th, an unwavering system, laying waste to the team's best academy products, a poor winning percentage, calling his team the worst the club has ever seen. But there was a single opponent against whom the Portuguese coach was not permitted to dance. You come at the sporting director, you had better succeed.
Regrettably, like many a top-flight right-back during Blackburn Rovers' championship 1994-95 season, the coach took on the executive and seems to have failed. Even the most distracted of readers can see the paradoxical situation: a coach who often railed at his players for losing one-on-one duels crumbling when confronted by the white heat and formidable presence of one of England's top division's most feared sporting directors.
And frankly, this whole bruising episode seems to paint Jason Wilcox in a whole new light. Perhaps it might have been tempting, based on his brief stint in a similar role with the Saints, to view him as merely a drudge within the club's structure: an individual whose appointment was due largely to his close relationship with ex-colleague Omar Berrada rather than any verifiable talent. How mistaken everyone was. In brilliantly outsmarting the club's celebrated head coach, as he outmanoeuvred the hapless a previous executive before him, Jason Wilcox has proved himself as one of football's true generals: a tactical intellect of which the club's mid-table rivals will now be justifiably concerned.
The Tactical Conflict Regarding Formation and Ideology
To illustrate, this was the director , after being involved in the hierarchy that appointed the 3-4-3 fundamentalist Amorim in the first place, was instrumental in trying to persuade Amorim to abandon his beloved 3-4-3. Naturally, these entreaties faced pushback. However, these judgements carry more weight when issued by a man of a man the unimpeachable soccer background he possesses, holder of three England caps and a contributor to a championship team decades past.
Maybe eventually he may be persuaded to outline his thought processes to the rest of us. Perhaps at some point questions may arise why Amorim is walking away with full compensation, without any penalty clause in place. The director speaks rarely publicly, and with very good reason. The real thinkers of this sport – men like Jason Wilcox – simply operate at a level beyond our own prosaic understanding. Were he to speak, most likely all we would hear would be ultrasonic blips and four-dimensional whirring. Wanting is not quite equivalent to being ready to comprehend it.
An Ultimate Power In Command
Naturally, in training our focus on Jason Wilcox we overlook the real power behind the club's current leadership. The director is, in reality, simply carrying out the commands of his ultimate superior Sir Jim Ratcliffe, who privately has made very clear his desire for a back four. According to reports, Ratcliffe has also proposed deploying the forward as a right wing-back. Ratcliffe is keen for United to embrace data science and metrics. According to ESPN, in an executive meeting soon after his minority ownership, he announced that United’s style to football “shall be decided in this room”.
Ultimately, Sir Jim is a specialist in this technical footballing stuff, leveraging his previous experience in industry and sailing. Most importantly he is incredibly rich, and as we all know, the wealthy are the best of us: more perceptive, more wise, more tactically astute, simply better. Who else could one trust to oversee a strategic plan of austerity, the building of a modern arena that appears a lot like an abstract design, the acquisition of a new striker?
A New Soccer Order: Directors Above Managers
This is a trend we are increasingly seeing at the elite levels of the game. Historically, clubs foolishly entrusted big footballing decisions to low-level employees such as coaches, talent spotters – even footballers. Maybe previously feasible for an up-and-coming, visionary coach with ideas and energy to go into an organization and see their vision through to completion. Yet how many businesses have these guys established? How many mass redundancies have they managed? Better by far to invest the real power where it rightly belongs: the executive class, the casually dressed executives, the individuals with impressive professional resumes. Better by far to determine the tactics by the directors and hire a coach who will adapt their offering accordingly. If managers were formerly chefs, they are now more akin to Deliveroo drivers: not really responsible for the food, yet finally accountable if it arrives poorly or fails to meet standards.
In the meantime, their job is increasingly not about crafting the philosophy and more about selling it: the receptionist of the operation, the visible figurehead for a club they have minimal power to change. Enzo Maresca takes a squad of literal children into the Champions League and secures two medium-sized trophies, and essentially is dismissed for talking. Wilfried Nancy finds his reputation ruined while the people who hired him continue to make errors indefinitely.
The Neoliberal Game: Responsibility for the Few
And possibly in a small way this is simply corporate governance in action: the rise of a gilded elite who are infallible, whose decisions remain untouchable, whose errors can always be sacked away without justification. Appoint the 3-4-3 coach and then dismiss them for playing too much 3-4-3. Hire the project manager and later bin them for taking excessive time. And most importantly be grateful; for the incremental season ticket price rises, for your new player acquisitions, for the reality that the adults – regardless of their expertise – are in charge.